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ACTS Program Formulation 
The following material has been extracted from "The Advanced Communications 




NASA had a very significant role in the establishment of satellite 
communications, first with the Syncom program to prove the feasibility of the 
geo-synchronous orbit and later with the ATS and CTS programs, which 
developed the C and Ku bands and led to the establishment of the commercial 
satellite communications industry. At this point, NASA directed its efforts to 
other space endeavors, expecting that the industry would continue the needed 
technology development to keep the industry viable and competitive. 
 
NASA's Re-entry into Communication R&D 
In 1974, several organizations began to assess the consequences of NASA's 
decision to essentially eliminate satellite communication activities that focused on 
commercial applications [11]. The Electronic Industries Association (EIA) issued 
a position paper in January 1974, which urged NASA to reconsider its decision. 
In January 1975, the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) 
issued a similar report. It urged NASA to re-enter the communication satellite 
field by sponsoring new families of application technology satellites. The report 
argued that from 1960 to 1973, "the federal government took the dominant role in 
communication satellite research and development, thereby providing the basis 
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for low-risk operational system development by private enterprise in the 1960s 
and 1970s." 
 
In the fall of 1975, NASA asked the National Research Council (NRC) to 
consider and report on the question: "Should federal research and development on 
satellite communication be resumed and, if so, what is the proper federal role in 
this field?" To undertake the study, the NRC formed a Committee on Satellite 
Communications, under the auspices of the Space Application Board. After 
studying this question, the consensus of the committee was that major advances in 
communication satellite technology required government investment, particularly 
in the areas where high technical risks were involved. This committee concluded 
that satellite communication R&D was an appropriate federal responsibility, and 
that NASA should resume the research and development activities needed to 
provide the new technology for future commercial communication needs. The 
NRC committee recommended, in a 1977 report [12], that NASA implement an 
experimental satellite communication technology flight program based on an 
assessment of need, technology projections, and service concept development. It 
recommended that the technical design of any NASA experimental 
communication satellite should support several end user service concepts, and that 
appropriate user groups should assist in the conceptual definition of both the 
needed technology and the experiments themselves. 
Based on the results of the NRC report, the increasing demand for domestic voice, 
video, and data traffic, and the foreign competition and prospects of trade 
disparity, President Jimmy Carter saw fit to reinstate federal sponsorship of 
communication satellite technology. Official sanction for NASA to resume its 
responsibility was contained in the October 1978 Presidential Directive (PD-42). 
This directive stated, "NASA will undertake carefully selected communication 
technology R&D. The emphasis will be to provide better frequency and orbit 
utilization approaches." 
The NASA Satellite Communication Program for the 1980s 
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In 1978, as a result of the Presidential Directive, NASA began the process of 
rebuilding its R&D activities in the communication satellite arena [13,14,15]. The 
future technology program was planned in cooperation with the National 
Research Council's Space Applications Board Subcommittee on Satellite 
Communications, whose membership consisted of leading common carriers, 
spacecraft manufacturers, and representatives of communication users. 
Market & System Studies  
In this first phase of the NASA program, market and system studies were 
conducted to determine future service demand and whether or not C- and Ku-band 
satellites could satisfy it. Two contracts were awarded to common carriers: 
Western Union Telegraph Company, and U.S. Telephone and Telegraph 
Company, which was a subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph 
(ITT) [16,17]. The emphasis of these studies was to forecast the 
telecommunications traffic that could be carried by satellite competitively. During 
this same time frame, two other system studies were conducted: one each by 
Hughes Aircraft and Ford Aerospace, with supporting studies by TRW, GE, and 
the Mitre Corporation [18,19]. Their purpose was to identify the technology 
needed to implement cost-effective and spectrum-conservative communication 
systems. The results were combined to define potential commercial system 
configurations that could address the market for trunking and customer premises 
services that was expected in the early 1990s. System requirements derived from 
these postulated commercial configurations formed the basis for the technology 
development program that followed. 
The market studies predicted that rapid growth in domestic voice, data, and video 
traffic would lead to a five-fold increase in U.S. communication demands by the 
early 1990s. A combination of these market projections and communication 
satellite license filings with the FCC portended a saturation of North American 
orbital arc capacity using the C- and Ku-band frequencies. To relieve the pressure 
of this expanding market, the 30/20 GHz frequency band was needed. As a result, 
the new NASA communication program for commercial application was named 
the 30/20 GHz Program and was structured to: 
• Develop selective high-risk, 30/20 GHz technologies that focused on relief 
of orbit and frequency congestion and developing new and affordable 
services 
• Promote effective utilization of the spectrum and growth in 
communications capacity 
• Ensure continued U.S. preeminence in satellite communications 
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Satellite Addressable Market Demand 
The technologies required to meet these objectives were judged to be of such high 
technical risk that they were beyond the capability of any one company to finance. 
In 1979, NASA designated the Lewis Research Center (LeRC) in Cleveland, 
Ohio, to be its lead center in planning and executing the commercial 
communication satellite technology R&D Program. In 1999, the Lewis Research 
Center's name was changed to the Glenn Research Center (GRC), in honor of 
John Glenn, astronaut and U.S. Senator from Ohio. 
Early communication satellite systems employed simple, bent-pipe transponders 
with a single antenna beam to cover a large region (such as the continental United 
States). The new NASA program needed to develop technology that would allow 
the frequency spectrum to be used more efficiently. One technique to accomplish 
this was to cover the region with many small spot beams so that the same 
frequency could be reused simultaneously in non-adjacent beams. Such frequency 
reuse increased the capacity of satellites by a factor of five to ten times that of a 
single beam satellite, with only a modest increase in spacecraft size, power, and 
weight. The technology to accomplish this high degree of frequency reuse 
employed antennas with high-gain spot beams and electronic systems with 
onboard switching and processing to inter-connect the spot beams. In addition, the 
high-gain antenna allowed for smaller aperture user terminals at higher data rates. 
This was the technology developed by NASA. 
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Technology Feasibility & Flight System Definition 
In 1980, the program moved forward in two phases. The first phase was to 1) 
continue the market studies to increase confidence in the forecast for orbit 
saturation and 2) to do proof-of-concept development of the identified 
technologies. The proof-of-concept program was a laboratory (breadboard) type 
of development to prove that the technologies were feasible. Approximately $50 
million was expended on the first phase. If the first phase proved successful, the 
second phase would consist of developing an experimental flight system to 
demonstrate that the technologies could provide reliable communications 
services. 
The first phase was fully supported by the entire service provider and satellite 
manufacturing community. The second phase of the program was the one that 
became controversial. The service providers had great concern about how reliably 
the technology would work in space, and therefore, argued for a flight program. 
Some satellite manufacturers, however, had reservations about proceeding with a 
flight program because they felt it would give the winning contractors of the 
NASA procurement an unfair competitive advantage. This controversy continued 
throughout most of the life of the ACTS program. 
Program Coordination with Industry 
Two industry committees were formed to guide the program. The NASA Ad Hoc 
Advisory Committee was created to provide general policy direction. The 
committee included notable representatives of both the system supplier and 
service supplier industry. Their contribution provided timely and sage review of 
the program, as well as providing NASA with insight into the industry philosophy 
relative to the roles and responsibilities of both government and the private sector. 
The second industry committee was a Carrier Working Group (CWG), consisting 
of representatives from all the major satellite service providers. The CWG was 
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charged with helping NASA formulate the technology and flight system 
requirements, develop experiments, and provide overall guidance. These 
requirements and experiments were deemed necessary by the CWG to 
demonstrate the readiness of not only the technology, but of its service 
applications as well. Coordination was also established between the Department 
of Defense and NASA, especially in the development of various critical advanced 
technology components. 
Proof-of-Concept Development 
The purpose of the proof-of-concept (POC) technology development was to 
demonstrate the technical feasibility of the key component building blocks 
[20,21]. The approach NASA used was to issue multiple contracts to various 
aerospace and related companies for the development of each high risk 
technology: multiple spot beam antenna, base band processor, TWTA, wide-band 
switch matrices, low-noise receiver, GaAs FET transmitter, GaAs IMPATT 
transmitter, and ground antenna. Duplicate awards for most of the critical 
technology components were employed to increase the probability of successful 
development, and to produce multiple sources for communication hardware. In 
addition, multiple awards helped to ensure that a variety of perspectives and 
technical approaches were brought into each development. These contracts called 
for the development of the technology, the construction of POC versions of the 
components, and their testing in the laboratory to verify performance. 
The POC hardware substantially reduced the risk associated with the planned 
development of the flight system. Another product of these technology contracts 
was the prediction of feasible component, subsystem, and system performance 
levels. NASA used these performance predictions to provide guidance for follow 
on technology development. Service providers and manufacturers could also use 
these predictions in planning activities for the commercial system designs of the 
early 1990s. 
The Department of Defense (DOD) participated in the NASA POC program. 
Several of the critical technology POC elements that were of interest to the DOD 
were co-funded by DOD and NASA. To enable the effective transfer of 
information that was generated in the program, all contractors were required to 
prepare task completion reports. These reports were presented at periodic industry 
briefings (only for interested U.S. parties) hosted by NASA. 
Flight System Definition Studies 
The need for a flight test program reflected the fact that much of the required 
technology had never been demonstrated in space. The flight test was to ensure 
that the technology base was mature and validated, providing the level of 
confidence recommended by industry as being necessary for commercial 
exploitation. The initial planning called for two experimental satellites to be built 
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and flown; one to demonstrate telephone trunking for high volume users in 
metropolitan areas, the second to demonstrate customer premises services using 
small and inexpensive earth terminals located at customer locations. 
In 1980, the two-flight concept was reduced to a single experimental spacecraft, 
primarily emphasizing customer premises services. This proved to be a wise 
decision since the introduction of fiber optics a few years later significantly 
reduced the cost for terrestrial trunking services, making satellites non-
competitive. 
In February 1982, Dr. Burt Edelson became NASA's associate administrator of 
the Office of Space Science and Application, and played a very important role in 
keeping the program alive. When the program was seriously threatened in 1982, 
Dr. Edelson restructured the 30/20 GHz program by broadening its applicability 
to the entire frequency spectrum for satellite communications. As a result, the 
experimental satellite system was renamed the Advanced Communications 
Technology Satellite (ACTS), and it focused primarily on the technology of 
multi-beam antennas and associated onboard switching and processing. 
Spacecraft capacity was reduced to a minimum for technical verification and 
experimentation only. 
Dr. Edelson provided key leadership for the ACTS program during his tenure at 
NASA, and was a vocal proponent of the program and its benefits until his death 
in 2002. Two other NASA managers who provided important leadership to the 
NASA Communications Program were Joe Sivo and Bob Lovell. Joe Sivo was 
the chief of the Communications and Applications division at NASA's Lewis 
Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio. Joe was the "Father of ACTS" and led the 
LeRC team in the late 1970s and the early 1980s as NASA restructured its 
communication program. Bob Lovell became chief of the Communications 
division at NASA Headquarters and worked with both Dr. Edelson and Joe Sivo 
to structure the ACTS program and guide it through technical and political 
hurdles in the early 1980s. Without Sivo, Lovell, and Edelson, the ACTS flight 
program would have never gotten off the ground. 
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Concurrent with the POC technology development, NASA was working with 
industry to define flight system concepts that would demonstrate ACTS 
technology readiness and its service capabilities. During the period of 1981-1983, 
the major spacecraft manufacturers' Ford Aerospace (now Space Systems Loral), 
Hughes Aircraft, TRW, GE, and RCA (both now part of Lockheed Martin) were 
funded by NASA to conduct system studies for defining a R&D spacecraft 
(ACTS) that could be flown by NASA. NASA then used the results from these 
system studies to develop the Request for Proposal (RFP) for the ACTS 
spacecraft and ground system. This RFP was issued by NASA in early 1983, with 
a proposal due date of June 1, 1983. Since the RFP required the development of 
very high-risk technology that had never been flown before, a cost-plus-fixed-fee 
type of contract was specified. 
The five separate flight system studies were conducted to get a wide range of 
views on what the ACTS spacecraft configuration should be and to promote 
competition for the procurement of the spacecraft. As it turns out, this process did 
not accomplish the latter objective and was complicated by the fact that there was 
not a clear consensus for the need for a flight program to prove the feasibility of 
the new technology. 
The Reagan administration espoused a minimal government involvement 
ideology. At the time, the Republican administration took the position that it was 
not the proper role of government to conduct a flight program for the purpose of 
proving technology for commercial purposes, especially for a profitable industry. 
There were many arguments presented by the Republican administration as to 
why the government should not sponsor the flight verification. These included 
arguments that the government was not capable of predicting technology for 
commercial application, and that the spot beam, frequency-reuse technology was 
not necessary because there was plenty of C-and Ku-band spectrum for future use. 
However, as we know today, the use of spotbeams allows a great increase in the 
amount of frequency reuse so that a single satellite can have a very large capacity. 
Without this spot beam increase in capacity, many of the mobile and broadband 
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satellite systems under development in the late 1990s, such as Iridium, Globalstar, 
Spaceway, Astrolink, and iSKY (formerly called KaStar), would not have been 
economical. All the developers of these systems make a strong case that their spot 
beam systems meet the current FCC requirement to more efficiently use the 
spectrum. The FCC has added this requirement since they realized that the 
frequency spectrum is a scarce resource. 
The US Congress in the 1980s was increasingly concerned about the country's 
economic competitiveness in high technology industries. Legislators were 
sensitive to areas such as satellite communication being challenged by foreign 
entities, where the federal government could improve U.S. competitiveness. The 
Democratic Congress listened to the arguments of the U.S. commercial satellite 
industry in support of a flight verification program and decided it should be 
conducted. This debate between the Republican administration and the 
Democratic Congress (including each side's constituencies) over the need for the 
ACTS flight test continued through launch of the ACTS in September of 1993. 
Later chapters in the Gedney et al. book cover this debate in much more detail. It 
is sufficient here to say that the difference in philosophy between the White 
House and Congress was great enough that Reagan's budget left the program 
without funds for five years in a row, and that Congress restored the funds in each 
budget during those five years. If nothing else, the ACTS program may have set a 
record in this regard. 
Bidding on the ACTS Contract  
The response to the ACTS RFP was disappointing because only one proposal was 
received. The team submitting the proposal consisted of RCA as prime integrating 
contractor and supplier of the spacecraft bus, with first-tier sub-contractors TRW 
(for the communication payload) and COMSAT (for the Master Control Station). 
Second-tier subcontractors included Motorola for the base band processor and 
Electromagnetic Sciences (now called EMS Technologies) for the spacecraft's 
antenna beam-forming network. Since TRW, Motorola, and Electromagnetic 
Sciences had developed major pieces of the ACTS technology in the proof-of-
concept development program, this team was very competent. Because the team 
represented a large cross-section of the U.S. industry involved in satellite 
communications, NASA believed that objectives of the program could still be 
achieved by the single bid. 
ACTS was to be placed into a low earth orbit by NASA's space shuttle, and the 
RFP required that the payload be constrained to as small a space in the shuttle's 
cargo bay as possible. One option was to use a Payload Assist Module PAM-D 
perigee stage to place ACTS into a geostationary transfer orbit (GTO) after 
deployment from the shuttle. Some pre-proposal studies showed that this 
approach would result in the ACTS only using one quarter of the shuttle's cargo 
bay volume. The next alternative was to use a larger capacity perigee stage "a 
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PAM-A" which would take up more volume in the cargo bay. NASA wanted to 
restrict the payload's volume in the cargo bay to limit the total cost of the mission, 
including launch. At this time, shuttle launch costs were based on the volume 
occupied in the cargo bay. This logic was somewhat questionable since the shuttle 
was not always flown with a full load. In fact, the NASA cost model used a 
shuttle load factor of 3/4 capacity to determine the pricing for payloads. Potential 
bidders questioned this requirement and sought a change. Prior to the receipt of 
proposals on June 1, 1983, Robert Berry, director of Space System Operations at 
Ford Aerospace, wrote to NASA on May 3, 1983, [22] and stated the following: 
"We believe that the technical approach which would create the least risk to 
NASA would be a PAM-A configuration satellite, unconstrained by the volume 
limitations of the PAM-D family of perigee stages. We have made the case that it 
is in NASA's best interest not to discourage the offer of a PAM-A configuration. 
It seems obvious to us that NASA's objectives in achieving an ACTS program 
offering innovative and unique associations with other government or commercial 
users can only be satisfied with a PAM-A equivalent spacecraft. We further 
believe that as the definition of NASA's high technology payload evolves, weight, 
power, footprint area, thermal considerations, and performance margins will move 
toward the limitation of the PAM-D configuration. On the other hand, ample 
margin would still exist with a PAM-A configuration." 
Ford Aerospace had planned to offer a PAM-A class spacecraft for the ACTS 
mission. We also had received notification from another payload user of their firm 
commitment for another payload, which would have been incorporated, on our 
satellite configuration along with the ACTS payload. In addition, we had been 
informed by a satellite operating company of its interest in leasing the ACTS 
payload, thus providing potential cost reimbursement to NASA. However, RFP 3-
511907 quantitatively defines the assignment of launch costs to overall program 
costs, but offers no quantitative offset for the substantially greater capability of a 
PAM-A configuration. This quantitative imbalance confers an apparent 
competitive cost advantage to a PAM-D class satellite configuration even though 
that configuration will not support the full achievement of NASA's overall 
program objectives. Should NASA subsequently decide that a PAM-A equivalent 
configuration is desirable for ACTS, Ford Aerospace would be pleased to offer a 
competitive solution. 
In a December 1983 Aviation Week & Space Technology article [23], Berry went 
further and said, "There is no way the ACTS payload is compatible with the 
McDonnell Douglas Delta (PAM-D) class upper stage." It was expected that the 
ACTS contractor would use a standard commercial bus to limit the non-recurring 
costs for the spacecraft. Ford Aerospace wanted to bid its standard PAM-A bus, 
which evidently would have taken up considerable volume in the shuttle. They 
must have perceived that this would have made them non-competitive, so 
therefore did not bid. As it turned out, Berry's statement that the ACTS weight 
requirement was beyond the PAM-D capability was true. When RCA bid the 
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ACTS job, they proposed a PAM-A con-figuration with the antenna reflectors 
folded across the top of the spacecraft to minimize the volume taken up in the 
shuttle. Not long after the contract was awarded, the folded reflector design was 
replaced with a truss structure arrangement that significantly increased the needed 
volume in the cargo bay. 
When ACTS was launched, it took up approximately one half of the cargo bay's 
volume. NASA's concern with limiting shuttle costs and its procurement 
regulations forbidding informal discussions with potential bidders after release of 
the RFP, resulted in improper treatment of a contractor's input. In hindsight, it is 
obvious that it would have been better for the program had the shuttle launch 
costs not been included in the proposal evaluation. The result would have been the 
receipt of two proposals instead of one. The other major potential bidder for 
ACTS was Hughes Aircraft Company. Although the reasons were not publicly 
stated, Hughes chose not to submit a bid for ACTS. 
Hughes Ka-band Filing 
Hughes questioned the ACTS program in principle as unnecessary subsidization 
of commercial operations and duplication of military technology development. To 
emphasize their point, they filed an application with the FCC in early December 
of 1983 for the development, launch, and operation of a two-satellite Ka-band 
domestic system. Their satellites were to be equipped with high-power spot beams 
focused on 16 major U.S. metropolitan areas. As such, it would allow the use of 
two meter customer-premises earth stations for business data services such as 
teleconferencing, high-speed document distribution, and remote printing. The first 
of their two proposed satellites was to be launched in December of 1988. 
 
Hughes noted in this filing that they expected the orbital allocations at the C- and 
Ku-bands to be exhausted following the next round of FCC assignments. In 
essence, Hughes agreed with NASA's C- and Ku-band saturation projections, 
which had been derived by Western Union. In fact, Hughes quoted the Western 
Union market study in their filing. This filing, however, was contrary to other 
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statements made by Hughes during the same time period that warned of a coming 
glut in transponder capacity. This contradiction and other factors led to 
speculation by observers [5] that Hughes opposed the ACTS flight program on 
purely competitive grounds. 
Nothing ever came of the Hughes filing, but it did set the stage for consistent 
Reagan administration opposition to ACTS. The administration turned against 
continuing ACTS as a flight program after Hughes filed with the FCC. Since 
ACTS and Hughes' system used the same 30/20 GHz frequencies, senior Hughes 
executives argued against continuing the program before the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) and NASA, claiming that a government-funded 
program would be redundant. When the Reagan administration sent its budget 
proposal for NASA to Congress at the end of January 1984, it reduced the funding 
to so small a level that a flight program could not proceed. 
ACTS Contract Signed 
In the ensuing months, a battle over the ACTS flight program was waged in the 
U.S. Congress. Congress became convinced that the ACTS program objectives 
were valid and important to carry out. In the latter part of May 1984, despite 
administration opposition, they approved a $40 M increase for the ACTS program 
to reinstate the flight verification phase. After President Reagan signed the FY 
1985 authorization and appropriation bills, it cleared the way for a contract 
signing with RCA on August 10, 1984, for the development of the ACTS flight 
system. This funding battle over ACTS between the administration and Congress 
continued for the next four years, with the administration trying to terminate 
ACTS each year. 
As initially proposed by RCA, ACTS system development was to take place over 
a five-year period with an engineering model development being completed in 
three years. Because of the complex coordination between the user terminals, the 
master control station, and the onboard switch system in setting up on-demand 
circuits, the development included a comprehensive, three-month test of the 
ACTS ground system with the spacecraft. The proposed five-year development 
time contrasts with the normal commercial satellite development of three years, 
and reflects the fact that the ACTS technology was well beyond the current state-
of-the-art. With the ACTS contract awarded in August of 1984, the scheduled 
launch date was September of 1989. 
As described in the Gedney et al book on ACTS, funding cutbacks, development 
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What is the proper role of government in technology development? The NASA 
ACTS program served a very important role in advancing satellite communication 
because the commercial satellite communication industry in the 1980s could not 
afford to take on the risk associated with the necessary technology. 
The business climate in the 1980s was entirely different than in the late 90s. 
Today, non-traditional satellite companies such as Motorola, iSKY, and Pasifik 
Satelit Nusantara (PSN)-to name just three-have found investor partners to put up 
billions of dollars for implementation of revolutionary satellite communication 
systems employing advanced technologies. Iridium is a 66 25 LEO satellite 
system that provides mobile communication anywhere in the world. iSKY is a 
GEO satellite system that provides broadband communications for the consumer 
Internet in the United States. In the case of PSN, the system is a GEO, handheld 
mobile communications system called ACeS. All three systems use multiple spot 
beam antennas, and both Iridium and AceS have on-board digital processing. 
Iridium also has inter-satellite links to provide global connectivity. Because of the 
success of many new satellite systems-such as NASA's ACTS, DOD's MilStar, 
and Hughes' DirecTV-many satellite service providers now view new technology 
not as a major risk factor but as a means to introduce new services. Another major 
difference today is that the perceived market potential is much greater than it was 
in the 1980s. 
In the 1980s, communications satellites were still in their infancy and large sums 
of capital were not available for risky ventures. The ACTS flight program was a 
proper role for the government in the 1980s. Due to differences in the business 
climate and the maturity of many technologies, a similar flight program is not 
considered necessary today. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 9, "The 
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